Busca pessoal

   Busca pessoal

ID Semântico:	http://lexml.gov.br/vocab/busca-pessoal
Classe:	Conceito Geral
Nível Técnico:	Especializado
Origem do Termo:	Português
Áreas de Foco:	Direito Processual Penal, Teoria Geral do Direito, Direito Processual
Jurisdição:	Brasil

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Significado Prático

• Direito processual penal.* Exame ou revista da pessoa humana, em todo o corpo, inclusive na roupa que veste e nos acessórios (pastas, bolsas etc.) que traz consigo, para apreender algo relacionado com o crime investigado, sempre que houver fundada suspeita de que oculta arma, coisa obtida por meio criminoso, instrumento de falsificação, coisa falsificada ou contrafeita ou outro objeto perigoso ou necessário para a apuração do crime ou para a defesa do réu.\n\n*Nota Comparada (Fonte: Dicionário Marcílio Atualizado Constantemente 2024):*\n#busca pessoal | #stop and frisk; #stop and\nsearch\n\n• Também conhecida nos EUA como #Terry\nstop; #Terry search; #pat-down.\n• A busca pessoal, no Brasil, é prevista no art.\n240, §2º, do Código de Processo Penal. É\nautorizada apenas “quando houver fundada\nsuspeita de que alguém oculte consigo arma\nproibida” ou outros objetos mencionados no\nartigo.\n• A Terry stop exige, a seu turno, reasonable\nsuspicion.\n\n• “When a police officer has a reasonable\nsuspicion that an individual is armed,\nengaged, or about to be engaged, in criminal\nconduct, the officer may briefly stop and\ndetain an individual for a pat-down search\nof outer clothing. A Terry stop is a seizure\nwithin the meaning of Fourth Amendment”.\n[fonte]\no fundada suspeita\no busca por apalpação, sem inserir as\nmãos em bolsos ou roupas.\no apreensão.\n\n• A pat-down search is when a police officer\npats down the outer surfaces of a person’s\nclothing in an attempt to find weapons.\n\n• If, during a pat-down, the officer feels an\nobject he reasonably suspects may be a\nweapon by its contour, the officer may\nreach for the object and remove it. [fonte]\no apalpa as superfícies externas.\n\n• The Third Circuit recently reheard the issue\nof passenger's rights in TSA security checks,\nfinding that airport screenings amount\nto Terry searches.\no reapreciou\no TSA = agência federal de Segurança\ndos Transportes.\no airport screenings = inspeção nos\naeroportos.\no Terry searches = busca pessoal.\n\n\n#fundadas suspeitas; #fundada suspeita (art. 244,\nCPP) = #reasonable suspicion.\nVide Black’s:\n• “A police officer must have a reasonable\nsuspicion to stop a person in a public place”.\n\nDiferença entre probable cause e reasonable\nsuspicion:\n• #probable cause = indícios suficientes (de\nautoria de crime). Equivalêncai no Brasil: art.\n312, CPP.\n• #reasonable suspicion = fundada suspeita.\nEquivalência no Brasil: art. 244, CPP.\nVeja:\n• https://www.thebusseylawfirm.com/crime-\nblog/criminal-defense/probable-cause-vs-\nreasonable-suspicion-whats-the-difference/\n• https://www.taylorlawco.com/blog/reasona\nble-suspicion-and-probable-cause-what-s-\nthe-difference-.cfm\n\n• https://dsmllp.com/difference-reasonable-\nsuspicion-probable-cause/\n• https://www.browninglonglaw.com/library/\ndifferences-between-reasonable-suspicion-\nand-probable-cause.cfm\n• https://www.jacksonvillecriminaldefenseatt\norneyblog.net/nervousness-is-insufficient-\nto-detain-you-during-a-routine-traffic-stop/\n• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reasonable_s\nuspicion\n\n• https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/vi\newcontent.cgi?article=1588&context=vlr\n\no In #Terry v. Ohio, Earl Warren held\nthat police officers could temporarily\ndetain a suspect, provided that they\nrelied upon "specific, reasonable\ninferences," and not simply upon an\n"inchoate and unparticularized\nsuspicion or '#hunch (#intuição)."'\nSince Terry, courts have strained to\ndistinguish "reasonable suspicion,"\nwhich is said to arise from the cool\nanalysis of objective and\nparticularized facts, from "mere\nhunches," which are said to be\nsubjective, generalized, unreasoned\nand therefore unreliable. Yet this\ndichotomy between facts and\nintuitions is built on sand. Emotions\nand intuitions are not obstacles to\nreason, but indispensable heuristic\ndevices that allow people to process\ndiffuse, complex information about\ntheir environment and make sense of\n\nthe world. The legal rules governing\npolice conduct are thus premised on\na mistaken assumption about human\ncognition.\n\nEm https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terry_v._Ohio:\n• Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was a\nlandmark decision of the Supreme Court of\nthe United States in which the Court ruled\nthat it is not unconstitutional for American\npolice to "#stop and frisk" (realizar #busca\npessoal em) a person they reasonably\nsuspect to be armed and involved in a crime.\no Literalmente:\n▪ #stop = #abordar (a polícia);\n#reter (o indivíduo, para\nquestionamento)\n▪ #frisk = #revistar (apalpando\no corpo)\n• Specifically, the decision held that it is not a\nviolation of the Fourth Amendment to the\nU.S. Constitution's prohibition on\nunreasonable searches and seizures when a\npolice officer stops a suspect on the street\nand questions him or her even without\nprobable cause to arrest, so long as the\npolice officer has a reasonable suspicion\nthat the person has committed, is\ncommitting, or is about to commit a crime.\n• The Court also ruled that the police officer\nmay perform a quick surface search of the\nperson's outer clothing for weapons if they\nhave reasonable suspicion that the person\nstopped is "armed and presently\ndangerous".\n\n• This reasonable suspicion must\nbe based on "specific and\narticulable facts", and not\nmerely upon an officer's #hunch\n(#intuição).\n\n• This permitted police action has\nsubsequently been referred to in short as a\n"stop and frisk," or simply a "Terry frisk".\n\n• The Terry standard was later extended to\ntemporary detentions of persons in vehicles,\nknown as traffic stops.\n\n• The rationale behind the Supreme Court\ndecision revolves around the understanding\nthat, as the opinion notes, "the exclusionary\nrule has its limitations."\n\n• The meaning of the rule is to protect\npersons from unreasonable searches and\nseizures aimed at gathering evidence, not\nsearches and seizures for other purposes\n(like prevention of crime or personal\nprotection of police officers).\nHolding:\n• Police may stop a person if they have a\n• reasonable suspicion that\n• the person has committed or is about to\ncommit a crime, and\n• may frisk the suspect for weapons if they\n• have reasonable suspicion that the suspect\nis armed and dangerous,\n\n• without violating the Fourth Amendment\nprohibition on unreasonable searches and\nseizures.\n\n\nO original da decisão Terry v. Ohio está em\nhttps://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/3\n92/1:\n• John W. TERRY, Petitioner, v. STATE OF\nOHIO.\n• Mr. Chief Justice WARREN delivered the\nopinion of the Court (foi o #relator do #voto\nvencedor).\n• (...)\n•\n22. Nonetheless, the notions which underlie both the\nwarrant procedure and the requirement of probable\ncause remain fully relevant in this context.\no\nIn order to assess the reasonableness of\nOfficer McFadden's conduct as a general\nproposition, it is necessary 'first to focus\nupon the governmental interest which\nallegedly justifies official intrusion upon the\nconstitutionally protected interests of the\nprivate citizen,' for there is 'no ready test for\ndetermining reasonableness other than by\nbalancing the need to search (or seize)\nagainst the invasion which the search (or\nseizure) entails.'\no\nCamara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.\n523, 534—535, 536 537, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1735,\n18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967).\no\nAnd in justifying the particular intrusion the\npolice officer must be able to point to\nspecific and articulable facts which,\ntaken together with rational inferences from\nthose facts, reasonably warrant that\nintrusion.18\n\no\nThe scheme of the Fourth\nAmendment becomes meaningful only when\nit is assured that at some point the conduct\nof those charged with enforcing the laws can\nbe subjected to the more detached, neutral\nscrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the\nreasonableness of a particular search or\nseizure in light of the particular\ncircumstances.\no\n19 And in making that assessment it is\nimperative that the facts be judged against\nan objective standard: would the facts\navailable to the officer at the moment of the\nseizure or the search 'warrant a man of\nreasonable caution in the belief' that the\naction taken was appropriate?\no\nCf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.\n132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); Beck\nv. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96—97, 85 S.Ct.\n223, 229, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964).20\no\nAnything less would invite intrusions upon\nconstitutionally guaranteed rights based on\nnothing more substantial than\ninarticulate hunches (intuições\ninarticuladas), a result this Court has\nconsistently refused to sanction.\no\nSee, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, supra; Rios v. United\nStates, 364 U.S. 253, 80 S.Ct. 1431, 4 L.Ed.2d\n1688 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.\n98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959).\no\nAnd simple "good faith on the part of the\narresting officer is not enough.' * * *\no\nIf subjective good faith alone were the test,\nthe protections of the Fourth\nAmendment would evaporate, and the\npeople would be 'secure in their persons,\nhouses, papers and effects,' only in the\ndiscretion of the police.'\no\nBeck v. Ohio, supra, at 97, 85 S.Ct. at 229.\n•\n\n• 30. (...)And in determining whether the\nofficer acted reasonably in such\ncircumstances, due weight must be given,\nnot to his inchoate and unparticularized\nsuspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific\nreasonable inferences which he is entitled\nto draw from the facts in light of his\nexperience.\n\nImportante:\n• #stop-and-frisk receipt =\no #recibo de abordagem;\no recibo de busca pessoal.\n• In the UK: stop-and-search receipt.\n• Vide:\no https://time.com/4051869/nypd-\nstop-and-frisk-receipts/\no https://www.met.police.uk/advice/a\ndvice-and-information/st-s/stop-and-\nsearch/stop-and-search-process/\no https://www.nydailynews.com/new-\nyork/nyc-crime/nypd-debuts-stop-\nand-frisk-receipts-new-rules-cops-\narticle-1.2374455\n_________________\n_________________\n\n… it is not recoverable under the #duty to mitigate\n[#dever de mitigar (o dano)]\n\n\n#mitigation-of-damages doctrine; #avoidable-\nconsequences doctrine; doctrine of #avoidable\nconsequences = #dever de mitigar (o dano).\nTag #mitigar\n________________\n\nhttps://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/25/us/suprem\ne-court-police-violence.html\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torres_v._Madrid:\nTorres v. Madrid (2021)\n• was a United States Supreme Court case\nbased on what constitutes a\n• "seizure"\n• in the context of the Fourth Amendment to\nthe United States Constitution,\n• in the immediate case,\n• in the situation where law enforcement had\nattempted to use physical force to stop a\nsuspect but failed to do so.\n\n• The Court ruled in a 5–3 decision that\no the use of physical force with the\nintent to restrain a person,\no even if that fails to restrain the\nperson,\no is considered a seizure (apreensão;\nprisão).\n\nHolding:\n• The application of physical force\n• to the body of a person\n• with intent to restrain\n\n• is a seizure\n• even if the person\no does not submit and\no is not subdued.\n_______________\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_v._Hodari_\nD.:\n\nCalifornia v. #Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621\n(1991),\n• was a United States Supreme Court case\nwhere the Court held that a\n• fleeing suspect is not "seized" under the\nterms of the Fourth Amendment\n• unless the pursuing officers apply physical\nforce to the suspect or\n• the suspect submits to officers' demands to\nhalt.\n\n• Consequently, evidence that is discarded by\na fleeing suspect\no prior to the point in time at which\nthey are seized\no is not subject to the Fourth\nAmendment's exclusionary rule.\n(…)\n• Writing for a 7-2 majority,\n• Justice Antonin Scalia held that cocaine was\nadmissible\n• because Hodari D. was not seized until he\nwas tackled by officers,\n\n• and he discarded the rock of cocaine before\nhe was seized by officers.\nHolding\n• During police pursuits (perseguição\npolicial),\n• a fleeing suspect is not seized unless\no (1) pursuing officers apply physical\nforce to the suspect or\no (2) the suspect submits to shows of\nauthority.\n_________________\n\nhttps://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/25/us/politics/\nford-supreme-court-liability.html\n• “Ford Can Be Sued in States\nWhere Accidents Occurred,\nSupreme Court Rules\n• The justices unanimously\nrejected a plea to limit\nproduct liability suits in state\ncourts.\n• The Supreme Court on\nThursday made it easier for\nconsumers injured by\nproducts to sue their\nmanufacturers, unanimously\nruling that courts have\njurisdiction over lawsuits filed\nin the consumers’ home\nstates notwithstanding that\nthe products were made and\nsold elsewhere so long as the\nmanufacturers did substantial\nbusiness in the states”.\n\n\nEm\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ford_Motor_Co._v._\nMontana_Eighth_Judicial_Dist.:\nFord Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth\nJudicial Dist. (2021)\n• was a U.S. Supreme Court case involving\n• personal jurisdiction\n• of a state court\n• in #product liability lawsuits.\no ação pleiteando indenização por\nresponsabilidade pelo #fato do\nproduto.\n▪ Veja art. 12 do CDC (Código\nde Defesa do Consumidor)\n▪ Tag #product-liability;\n#products liability\n• The case, consolidated with Ford Motor Co.\nv. Bandemer,\n• involved two product liability lawsuits\n• brought against the Ford Motor Company\n• at the state level related to two drivers'\ninjuries in separate accidents involving\nFord's vehicles in Montana and Minnesota.\n• Ford challenged the lawsuits as the vehicles\nin question were manufactured elsewhere\n• so the states did not have #personal\njurisdiction over that conduct. = ação\nfundada em direito pessoal.\no Vide expressão usada no art. 46,\ncaput, do CPC/15.\n\n• The Supreme Court ruled in a 8–0 decision\nthat because, under the Due Process Clause,\n\nthe claims "arise out of or relate to" Ford's\nbusiness and marketing activities,\no those activities gave sufficient claim\nfor the states to assert personal\njurisdiction over the liability lawsuits.\n\n• No Brasil, veja o art. 53, IV e V, do CPC/15.\n\nHolding:\n• The connection between\no the plaintiffs’ claims and\no Ford’s activities\n• in the forum States is\n• close enough to support specific\njurisdiction.\n\n• #specific jurisdiction = competência\nfundada em contatos mínimos do réu com o\nforo selecionado pelo autor.\n___________________\n___________________\n\n\n#instruction; #jury instruction; #jury charge;

Simplificação de Linguagem (Lei 15.263/2025)

Abaixo, a comparação prática de aplicação do termo sob a ótica do acesso à justiça:

Redação Formal (Juridiquês)	Redação Cidadã (Linguagem Simples)
"Ocorreu a aplicação de BUSCA PESSOAL nos autos do processo."	"Ocorreu o uso prático de BUSCA PESSOAL de forma direta e acessível no caso."

Detalhes Classificatórios

• Áreas do Direito associadas: Direito Processual Penal, Teoria Geral do Direito, Direito Processual
• Classe Terminológica: Conceito Geral
• Natureza Jurídica: Definição Doutrinária
• Nível Técnico sugerido: Especializado

Aspectos Linguísticos

• Idioma originário: Português
• Etimologia: Origem da linguagem jurídica.
• Pronúncia ou leitura recomendada: busca pessoal

Referência Bibliográfica

• Dicionário Brasileiro de Linguagem Jurídica (EPUB 3.3) — B.xhtml | Wikibooks: Dicionário Brasileiro de Linguagem Jurídica | Dicionário Marcílio Atualizado Constantemente (2024)